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THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE
TED BANKS* AND JOE MURPHY**

INTRODUCTION

It was not so long ago that the concept of international criminal law
was an idea with which lawyers struggled. In 1987, Ved Nanda and M.
Cherif Bassiouni put together what may have been the first one-volume
compendium of information on antitrust, securities, extradition, tax,
and other subjects that made up the developing area of international
Today, it is well-accepted that there are certain
criminal law.
standards of behavior that are the norm in practically all nations, and
through national laws and multinational treaties, these principles are
entering the realm of customary international law.
Developments in the area of competition law, or antitrust as it is
known in some countries, have been particularly dramatic. Countries
understand that the encouragement of competition is a key to economic
development, and national laws have been enacted where they did not
exist before, along with enforcement cooperation agreements among
increasing numbers of countries.' Enforcement of criminal antitrust
laws takes place against both individuals and businesses, 2 and while it
is clear that there are situations where business entities must be held
responsible for actions of their employees, there are other situations
where the intent of the corporation may be contrary to the actions of the
employee. Throughout the world, in competition law, as well as in other
areas of law, there is a consensus that it is appropriate for companies to
adopt compliance and ethics programs to utilize management
techniques to foster compliance with law. So, as standards of corporate

* Counsel, Schoeman Updike Kaufman & Scharf; President, Compliance & Competition
Consultants, LLC; Editor, Corporate Legal Compliance Handbook (Wolters Kluwer, 2011)
** Director of Public Policy, Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics; author, 501
Ideas for Your Compliance and Ethics Program (SCCE; 2008).
1. See Antitrust Division Update, Spring 2011, InternationalProgram,U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/division-update/2011/international-program.html
(last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
2. In some jurisdictions, however, particularly those under civil law, corporations
are not subject to criminal law. See, e.g., Nora Gotzmann, Legal Personality of the
Corporation and International Criminal Law: Globalisation, Corporate Human Rights
Abuses and the Rome Statute, 1 QUEENSL. L. STUDENT REV. 37, 38 (2008), available at
http://www.law.uq.edu.aularticles/qlsr/Gotzmann-QLSR.pdf.
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conduct become more universal, they reflect adherence to what is
essentially an international law - the international law of competition.
At the same time, more national authorities recognize that companies
are expected to have compliance programs, and that a bona fide
compliance program reflects a corporate intent not to violate the law,
and therefore should be a positive factor in how authorities treat such
companies, including as a mitigating factor for any penalty that might
be imposed based on the ultra vires act by an employee.
It is well accepted that compliance and ethics programs are an
expected part of corporate activity, and while no program can always
guarantee human behavior, these programs do work to mitigate
violations of law. Indeed, it can be said that it is now a standard for
companies to have compliance programs or at least some elements of
such programs such as codes of conduct. We submit that this growing
recognition of the purpose of compliance and ethics programs has
reached broad-based acceptance and should now be recognized in the
competition law field by the United States and other governments as a
standard of international law.
THE CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY

Under many legal regimes, a corporation cannot be criminally
punished for the actions of its employees, and until relatively recently
(at least if you consider a century relatively recent), under the common
law, a corporation was viewed as a legal fiction, 3 which could not be
held liable for the criminal conduct of its employees. In the United
States, it was not until 1909, in New York Central & Hudson River
Railroad v. United States,4 that the Supreme Court ruled that because
the great majority of business transactions were conducted by
corporations, it was time to abandon the "old and exploded doctrine"
that a corporation was not indictable. 5 The Court reasoned that, as a
matter of public policy, because a corporation could be held civilly
liable, criminal liability should also follow. 6
This concept of corporate liability has been extended to the point
where the business is often held liable for acts of employees even if the

3. "Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience when it has no soul to be
damned and no body to be kicked?" SEC v. John Adams Trust Corp., 697 F. Supp. 573,
579 n.6 (D. Mass. 1988) (quoting Edward, First Baron Thurlow (1731-1806) in MERVYN A.
KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CORPORATION (1977)).

4. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
5. Id. at 496.
6. Id. at 493-94.
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company was not aware of the violation, 7 prohibited the conduct that
led to the violation,8 or there was no actual benefit to the corporation
through the acts of the employee. 9 So even if none of the three
justifications for corporate liability are present, i.e., knowledge, benefit,
or authority, corporate liability for the acts of an employee - in addition
to the liability of the employee - may still be found. A number of
reasons have been given for this approach, but a consistent argument is
that this type of liability will have an in terrorem effect on the
corporation and force the entity to make certain that employees obey
the law.10 As a practical matter, it also reflects the reality that
employees working through a corporation, whether or not their actions
are authorized, can cause harm far beyond the abilities of one person.
Therefore, according to this line of reasoning, it is appropriate that the
entity be punished criminally (and pay civil damages).
The usual rule in the United States and other common law
countries is that a corporation is liable for acts of agents and employees
acting within the scope of their employment and, in most cases, with
the intent to benefit the company."
This approach derives from the
common law doctrine of respondeat superior, which held that a master
is generally liable for the actions of servants, but may escape liability if
the servant acts outside the scope of employment (i.e., takes action for
7. A company may be held liable for acts of employees when the company was under
prior ownership. See, e.g., United States v. Alamo Bank of Texas, 880 F.2d 828, 830 (5th
Cir. 1989).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Portac, Inc., 869 F.2d 1288, 1293 (9th Cir. 1989). Under
the US Attorneys' Manual the prosecution may, in its discretion, choose not to bring an
action against a corporation based on evidence of due diligence to prevent wrongdoing (the
case of the "rogue employee"). One older case that appears to have allowed a corporation
to escape liability as a matter of law based on due diligence to prevent legal violations is
Holland Furnace Co. v. United States, 158 F.2d 2, 5-6, 8 (6th Cir. 1946).
9. For example, a corporation may be held liable for sexual harassment under the
"hostile work environment" theory when it fails to take action to stop the inappropriate
behavior of employees. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998).
However, if the
corporation was diligent in its efforts to prevent and stop such behavior, even if imperfect,
then it can avoid liability. The same reasoning, we posit, should apply to compliance
efforts in general.
10. For example, in Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534 (Can.), the Supreme Court of
Canada found a nonprofit organization that took care of abused children liable for sexual
molestation committed by an employee, even though the agency had no knowledge of the
employee's record as a pedophile when he was hired, and the employee was immediately
discharged when his improper conduct became known. The court found that vicarious
liability was appropriate in order to provide compensation to injured parties and to
provide an incentive to employers to make sure that intentional misconduct would not
occur (deterrence of future harm). Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534 (Can.).
11. United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1083 (1981).
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which there is no actual or apparent authority). 12 The concept of
apparent authority, the authority that outsiders would normally
assume the agent to possess judging from his or her position in the
company and the circumstances surrounding previous instances of
conduct, is often the foundation for a finding of corporate liability. 13
Employees are assumed to be acting within the scope of their
employment 14 if they are doing acts on the corporation's behalf in the
performance of their general line of work. 15 An agent must be
"performing acts of the kind which he is authorized to perform, and
those acts must be motivated -

at least in part -

by an intent to

benefit the corporation."16 It is not necessary that the acts actually
benefited the corporation, only that they were intended to do so.
The court decisions and statutes that led to these multiple bases for
finding enterprise liability grew up in an era where there was
recognition of the power of the "faceless" corporation and the need to
control its activities. Courts would impute knowledge or intent to the
corporation, even where there was no benefit to the enterprise by the
wrongful acts of the employee and the activities did not benefit the
corporation, although some courts are willing to consider whether the
violation was foreseeable.1 7 In other situations, liability might be
imputed to a corporate officer or director for failure to exert their
authority to ensure that the corporation (i.e., acting through employees)
did not do wrong.' 8
But it is also an inescapable fact of our human existence that
people are fallible, and that in some cases people will ignore
instructions and do things that they were expressly forbidden to do. By
holding a corporation liable for virtually anything that any employee
does, a situation of strict liability is created that may, in fact, be outside
the scope of many laws that require an intent to violate the law.

12. See, e.g., Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 63 (4th Cir. 1993).
13. United States v. Bi-Co Pavers, Inc., 741 F.2d 730, 737 (5th Cir. 1984).
14. Activities are deemed to be within the scope of employment when they are "so
closely connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably
incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones,
of carrying out the objectives of the employment." Domar Ocean Transp., Ltd. v. Indep.
Ref. Co., 783 F.2d 1185, 1190 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 502 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984)).
15. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
16. United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241-42 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
991 (1982).
17. City of Vernon v. Southern California Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir.
1992); Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1962);
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 964 F. Supp. 486, 490-91 (D.D.C.
1997).

18. See, e.g., Hoye v. Meek, 795 F.2d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 1986).
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Notwithstanding the desire to control the power of the corporation,
there are limits to what it can do. The efforts of the corporation to
control the actions of employees are a valid consideration in
determining whether the corporation should be held liable for the
actions of an employee, as was noted in the instructions to the jury after
the trial of Arthur Andersen in connection with the Enron debacle:
If an agent was acting within the scope of his or her
employment, the fact that the agent's act was illegal, contrary
to the partnership's instructions, or against the partnership's
policies does not relieve the partnership of responsibility for the
agent's acts. A partnership may be held responsible for the acts
its agents performed within the scope of their employment even
though the agent's conduct may be contrary to the partnership's
actual instructions or contrary to the partnership's stated
policies. You may, however, consider the existence of Andersen's
policies and instructions, and the diligence of its efforts to
enforce any such policies and instructions, in determining
whether the firm's agents were acting within the scope of their
employment. 19
The key here is "diligence." Was a compliance program something
that existed only on paper, 20 or were there indicia of sincerity on the
part of the corporation that showed that it legitimately tried to enforce
its policy of compliance? The diligence of the corporation in enforcing
its policy should be a key factor in determining if it is the kind of
program that should entitle the corporation to some measure of
mitigation from legal penalties imposed as a result of the actions of an
employee that disobeyed the policy. 21

19. CORP. LEGAL COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 1-6 n.13.1 (Theodore L. Banks & Frederick

Z. Banks eds., 2008) (quoting United States v. Arthur Andersen, Crim. No. H-02-121 (S.D.
Tex. June 5, 2002)) (emphasis added).
20. CHARLES A. BANE, THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES: THE TREBLE
DAMAGE ACTIONS 13 (1973) (In United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. 20399
(E.D. Pa. 1960), Judge Ganey stated, "[The antitrust policy] was observed in its breach
rather than in its enforcement. .. I am not naive enough to believe that General Electric
didn't know about [the conspiracy] and it didn't meet with their hearty approbation."
21. Barry J. Lipson, A Survey On the Ins and Outs of Antitrust Compliance, 51
ANTITRUST L.J. 517, 525-26 n.15 (jury instruction in United States v. Koppers Co., No. 7985 (D. Conn.) (June 12, 1980) ("One of the factors, among others, that you may consider in
determining the intent imputed to Koppers Company through its [managerial] agents or
employees is whether or not that corporation had an antitrust compliance policy. In this
regard, you are instructed that the mere existence of an antitrust compliance policy does
not automatically mean that a corporation did not have the necessary imputed intent. If,
however, you find that Koppers Company acted diligently in the promulgation,
dissemination, and enforcement of an antitrust compliance program in an active good
faith effort to ensure that the employees would abide by the law, you may take this fact
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Competition law imposes certain standards of behavior that are
accepted because of an understanding that society benefits from
competition. Therefore, in most cases, cartels are prohibited, as is
abuse of market power or dominance. There is a recognition in many
areas of law that transparency is beneficial, and thus bribes or secret
rebates are prohibited for their disruptive impact on competition, as
well as their inherent corruptness.
But how do these standards become accepted? It is not sufficient
only to implement national laws and multinational agreements.
Enforcement authorities recognize that there must also be private
action to enforce policies within corporations and to demonstrate that
noncompliance with law will not be tolerated. As will be discussed
below, there are benchmarks of what is an "effective" compliance and
ethics program that have received broad-based acceptance. Standards
of international competition law cannot have their desired impact
without international standards and efforts for compliance. Companies
need to be able to know that what they do to implement compliance
standards does matter so that they will make a diligent effort to
prevent cartel behavior from happening. If a company has taken
serious action to enforce its standards, such as by discharge of
employees who violate the law, 22 this level of corporate compliance,
which is expected by enforcement authorities, should be recognized
when deciding how to treat corporations, including charging and
penalty decisions.
So, there is a combination of factors at work here. Competition law
standards are virtually universal in their acceptance. 23 To get those
standards to actually be implemented by corporations, there need to be
corporate compliance and ethics programs in place. Standards of
culpability recognize that factors such as intent, knowledge, and benefit
are relevant to findings of corporate liability. A number of countries do
specifically encourage compliance and ethics programs, including in the
antitrust area. 24
Therefore, this growing, worldwide acceptance,
into account in determining whether or not to impute an agent or employee's intent to the
Koppers Company.").
22. See United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that
the jury instruction, "A corporation may be responsible for the acts of its agents done or
made within the scope of its authority, even though the agent's conduct may be contrary
to the corporation's actual instruction or contrary to the corporation's stated policies does
not impose strict liability on the corporation, but instead means that a corporation "may
be liable for acts of its employees done contrary to express instructions and policies, but
that the existence of such instructions and policies may be considered in determining
whether the employee in fact acted to benefit the corporation.").
23. See e.g., SCOTT H. JACOBS, OECD, REGULATORY REFORM IN MEXICO 59 (1999).
24. See infra. Some of the enforcement agencies provide videos to show the folly of
antitrust violations, and to aid in compliance training. See, e.g., NMaMovie, Leniency in
Cartel Cases, YOUTUBE (June 9, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5diFAaJdwel
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combined with universal necessity, has established an international law
not just for antitrust, but for antitrust compliance. The countries that
do not formally recognize the value of bona fide compliance programs as
relevant to corporate liability, perhaps seduced by the possibility of
collecting huge fines from a corporate piggy-bank, are out-of-step with
the reality of what is necessary to truly promote the principles of
competition law.
Perhaps one fundamental difficulty here is that no form of
organizational punishment seems to hit exactly the "right" target when
dealing with large corporations. Punishment of individual employees
alone does not seem fair, because the corporate entity goes unscathed.
Yet punishing the corporation for individual acts that it could not
Moreover, for large multinational
control also seems unfair.
corporations, small fines appear meaningless, yet fines large enough to
have an impact cause unavoidable collateral damage to innocent parties
uninvolved in the wrongful acts. For publicly-traded corporations,
managers writing enormous checks for major violations seem merely to
be spending other people's money - the distant shareholders who may
largely constitute innocent, passive investors such as pensioners in any
event.
It is a frustrating exercise, meting out punishment to
amorphous entities.
We believe the most effective place to focus attention is how best to
prevent violations within the organization. Preventing the massive
harm that a large corporation can cause is considerably more useful
than figuring out who to punish after the harm is done. The vehicle for
prevention in large organization is the compliance and ethics program.
A VERY BRIEF HISTORY OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAMS

Compliance and ethics programs are management systems to
prevent and detect misconduct, i.e., illegal and unethical conduct. The
genesis of these programs is probably in the antitrust field, beginning
with the electrical equipment conspiracies in the 1950s and 60s. 25 The
field grew as other risk areas developed similar needs for internal
corporate efforts, including such areas as environmental compliance,
workplace safety, employment discrimination, and foreign corrupt
payments.
However, until 1991 the focus was almost always on
compliance confined to specific risk areas.

(Netherlands); Konkurrensverket, Be the First to Tell - A Film About Leniency (trailer),
YouTUBE (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OE8WmibbaSs&feature=
related (Sweden); European Commission Audiovisual Services, Benefits of Competition
Policyfor Consumers (Oct. 20, 2009), http://ec.europa.eulavservices/videolvideoplayer.cfm?
ref-1063248& sitelang=en (EU).
25. See e.g., BANE, supra note 20.
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In 1991, the United States Sentencing Commission issued
sentencing guidelines for federal judges to use in criminal cases
involving organizations. 26 While the guidelines imposed tough terms
that resulted in substantial increases in penalties imposed, they also
recognized effective compliance and ethics programs as a significant
mitigation factor. As part of this formula, the Guidelines set out a
standard for such programs based on seven elements. 2 7 These
standards used an approach aptly described as "structured flexibility," 2 8
setting minimum standards but giving organizations flexibility in the
details of their programs. If a company had such a program and met
certain other conditions, it was to be given a substantial reduction in its
fine.
In 2009, the Organization for Economic Development and
Cooperation, through its Working Group on Bribery, issued the first
international standard for compliance and ethics programs. 29 In a
document called the Good Practice Guidance, the Working Group
enumerated twelve elements for an anti-bribery program. 30 These
elements, substantially similar to the seven elements in the Sentencing
Guidelines, set out a framework that, for the most part, could be easily
adapted to any type of compliance and ethics program. That the
Sentencing Guidelines and the Good Practice Guidance would be very
similar was a predictable result for a fundamental reason. Compliance
and ethics programs are not some bureaucratic formulation or a
mysterious concoction; rather, they are the application of basic
management principles to accomplish a defined task: prevention and
detection of misconduct. The fact that compliance programs operate
within the organization and form part of the organization's fabric
explain why their ability to prevent harm is so much greater than the
government's. Working within the organization provides the access
necessary to be effective and to interdict misconduct before it comes to
complete fruition. 31

26. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 (1991).
27. Id. § 8A1.2(k).
28. Winthrop M. Swenson & Nolan E. Clark, The New FederalSentencing Guidelines:

Three Keys to Understandingthe Credit for Compliance Programs,1 CORP. CONDUCT
(1991).
29. Organization

for

Economic

Cooperation

and

Development

Q. 3

[OECD],

Recommendation of the Council for FurtherCombating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
http://www.oecd.org/
in International Business Transactions (Nov. 26, 2009),
dataoecd/11/40/44176910.pdf.
30. OECD, Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance
(adopted Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/51/44884389.pdf.
31. See generally CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAw ENDS: THE SOCIAL
CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975) (limitations of external forces in reaching
within the corporate entity).
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RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE AND VALUE OF COMPLIANCE AND
ETHICS PROGRAMS

The Sentencing Guidelines model, setting a standard for an
effective program and then providing incentives to companies to adopt
such programs, has developed as a global model.
Since 1991,
government agencies in the United States and around the world have
recognized the essential role of compliance and ethics programs, and
government's role in promoting these programs. In the United States,
for example, the U.S. Attorney's Manual advises federal prosecutors to
take into account the existence of an effective program in deciding how
and whether to proceed in prosecuting a company (with the exception
only of antitrust violations). 32 The Department of Justice's Criminal
Division, in settling cases such as Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
prosecutions, has followed the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (and more
recently the OECD Good Practice Guidance) standards in requiring
companies to implement strong programs as part of these settlements. 33
Regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, have held public hearings on the issue of the agency's role
vis-A-vis such programs and issued guidance to industry.3 4 The U.S.
Supreme Court, in dealing with employment discrimination and
harassment, has recognized the role of compliance programs in
preventing such socially undesirable conduct; in the case of certain
forms of harassment the existence of a compliance program can form
part of the defense, 35 and for any form of employment discrimination
compliance efforts can be a defense to punitive damages. 36
Globally, governments concerned with protecting privacy have
followed the compliance program model, calling on companies to have a
designated privacy officer or "data controller" to ensure compliance with
privacy laws. 3 7 Some legal systems have provided that compliance
efforts can serve as a defense, either to corporate liability 38 or to
32. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, CH. 9-28.800 CORPORATE

COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (2008), http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room
/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm#9-28.800.
33. See e.g., Department's Sentencing Memorandum at 12, United States v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft, No. 08-CR-367-RJL (D.D.C. 2008).
34. FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N, 125 FERC 1 61,058, POLICY STATEMENT ON
COMPLIANCE (Oct. 16, 2008), available at http://www.balch.com/files/upload/FERCPolicyStmt_onCompOct_16_08.pdf.
35. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, supra note 9; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 764-765 (1998) (adopting the same holding as Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton).
36. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 546-47 (1999).
37. OECD, PRIVACY ONLINE: OECD GUIDANCE ON POLICY AND PRACTICE, 231-32
(2003).
38. See Bribery Act (Act. No. 23/2010) (U.K.); Ministry of Justice, Consultation on
Guidance About Commercial OrganisationsPreventing Bribery (Section 9 of the Bribery
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liability for directors under a due diligence defense.
Compliance
programs may be specifically acknowledged as factors in reducing
penalties for violations, as the Singapore Competition Commission has
done. 39
Why has this trend developed? The recognition of the importance
of compliance programs addresses a fundamental reality about
organizations; no matter how fond lawyers may be of the legal fiction
that a corporation is a "person," like all fiction it should not be confused
with reality. Corporations are not simply large individuals; they are
complicated collections of individuals, departments, cultures,
motivations, and all the other elements that constitute a society. No
company, and no society in the history of mankind, has been able to
control the conduct of all its members in all their actions. Simply
punishing an organization because one or more of its members does
something wrong makes sense only if it serves to prevent misconduct.
But how does an organization act to prevent misconduct? There is only
one method, and that is the use of management tools to prevent and
detect misconduct, i.e., a compliance and ethics program. If a company
has not made the effort to prevent violations, then punishment serves a
very important and useful social function - driving management to take
the necessary steps. But if a company uses true diligence to prevent
misconduct, then punishment serves no deterrent function, and
becomes only an amoral revenue raising exercise.
THE "ANTITRUST DIVISION"

Logic, experience, and public policy strongly favor development of
effective organizational compliance and ethics programs. However,
there has emerged in the enforcement community a sharp division in
approach. In the U.S. Department of Justice, the Criminal Division,
with responsibility for a broad range of offenses such as fraud and
FCPA violations, is vocal about the importance of such programs, and
specifically cites them as a factor in its enforcement decisions. 40 It also
exacts from violators a requirement that they reform their conduct by
adopting rigorous programs. Even companies that voluntarily disclose

Act 2010), CP 11/10 (Nov. 8, 2010) (U.K.) http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/docs/
bribery-act-guidance-consultation1.pdf. Credit for compliance is also given in Italy. See
e.g., Francesca Chirara Bevilacqua, Corporate Compliance Programs Under Italian Law,
ETHIKOS AND CORP. CONDUCT Q. (Nov./Dec. 2006), http://www.ethikospublication.com/
html/italy.html.
39. COMPETITION COMM'N OF SINGAPORE, CCS GUIDELINES ON THE APPROPRIATE

AMOUNT OF PENALTY 1 2.13 (June 2007), available at http://app.ccs.gov.sg/cms/
user documents/main/pdf/CCSGuidelinePenalty_20071033.pdf.

40. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, CH. 9-28.800 CORPORATE

COMPLIANCE

PROGRAMS

(2008),

usam/title9/28mcrm.htm#9-28.800.

http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia reading room/
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violations must take this step. Similarly, the Department's
Environmental and Natural Resources Division has addressed
compliance and ethics programs as a key factor in prosecutorial
decisions since 1991.41 But the Department's Antitrust Division, in its
enforcement actions against cartel conduct, has created a split in
approaches, taking the position that it will not consider programs.
Moreover, unlike the Criminal Division, even admitted criminal
violators who are accepted into the Antitrust Division's leniency
program, need do absolutely nothing regarding institution of a
program. 42
In fact, in contrast to the approach of the Sentencing Commission,
the Supreme Court in the context of employment discrimination, and
the Criminal and Environmental Divisions in the same Justice
Department, the Antitrust Division dismisses as "failed programs" any
program, no matter how diligent, if it fails to prevent or be the first in
an industry to detect a violation. 43 As one Division spokesperson has
said, "We will not reward a company for a failed compliance program
that neither prevented nor detected the wrongdoing." 44 This split has
been cursorily "explained" as existing because antitrust "goes to the
heart of the business." 45 Nothing further is offered to justify this, or
explain why a price-fixing conspiracy in a small subsidiary in Biloxi
goes more to the core of a business while a securities fraud from
headquarters or a bribe paid to a another country's prime minister is
somehow peripheral.
Remarkably, in the global context, this division in approaches has
been exacerbated by the EU Commission, adopting in almost the same
words the position of this one Justice Department Division. 46 On the
41. ENV'T & NATURAL RES. Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACTORS IN DECISIONS ON
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF
SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE OR DISCLOSURE EFFORTS BY THE VIOLATOR (July 1,

1991) http://www.justice.gov/enrd/3058.htm.
42. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAM 1-2 (Aug. 10, 1993),

available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf.
43. Gary R. Spratling, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Speech at the U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n Nat'l Symposium: Corporate Crime in America (Sept. 18, 1995), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/0456.htm.
44. Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. for Crim. Enforcement, Antitrust
Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Agency Update with the Antitrust Division DAAGs, Speech at
American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Spring Mtg. (Mar. 30, 2011).
45. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, Ch. 9-28.400, 928.800 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (2008), available at http://www.justice.

gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm ("In addition, the nature of
some crimes, e.g., antitrust violations, may be such that national law enforcement policies
mandate prosecutions of corporations notwithstanding the existence of a compliance
program."). No illustrative examples are provided.
46. Press Release, Speech by Joaquin Almunia, Vice President, Eur. Comm'n for
Competition Policy, Compliance and Competition Policy (Oct. 25, 2010), available at
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other hand both the Antitrust Division and the EU, as well as more
than 50 jurisdictions worldwide, have so-called leniency programs. 47
Under these arrangements, the first company involved in a cartel to
report the violation gets a complete pass from any form of
punishment. 48 Those entering such a leniency program need not have a
program at the time of the violation, nor need they even consider one
going forward. In other words, violators who have not even made a
small effort to prevent violations are richly rewarded; companies that
do try even with extraordinary diligence, however, are punished no
matter how hard they tried. In short, while others in the global
enforcement and regulatory world go to substantial efforts to promote
and recognize compliance and ethics programs, those on the other side
of this "antitrust division" offer companies with even the most diligent
programs no credit when investigating, no credit in the decision to
prosecute, and no credit regarding penalties. Those who win the race to
the prosecutor to report cartel violations face no penalties and are not
required to have the inconvenience of taking at least some compliance
program steps despite admitting to the most destructive types of
competition law violations.
This "antitrust division" exists not only between the Antitrust
Division and EU on the one hand, and enforcement authorities in other
areas of the law, but it also exists within the antitrust enforcement
community itself. While the Antitrust Division and EU scoff at socalled "failed programs," and do nothing to recognize programs at any
stage of enforcement, other competition law enforcement agencies have
recognized the importance of such programs in a variety of ways. The
importance of compliance programs, in some instances as part of case
settlements, has been recognized in Canada, 49 Norway,50 the UK,51
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/586&format=PDF&
aged=1&anguage=EN&guLanguage=en.
47. Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. for Crim. Enforcement, Antitrust
Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Speech at the 24th Annual National Institute on White Collar
Crime: The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades
(Feb. 25, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255515.pdf.
48. Id.
49. COMPETITION BUREAU CANADA, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 15 (Sept.
2010), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/Corporate
CompliancePrograms-sept-2010-e.pdf/$FILE/CorporateCompliancePrograms-sept-2010e.pdf.
50. KONKURRANSETILSYNET (NORWEGIAN COMPETITION AUTHORITY), REGULATION ON
THE CALCULATION OF AND LENIENCY FROM ADMINISTRATIVE FINES
3 (Aug. 2005),
available at http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/en/legislation/Regulation-on-the-calcula
tion-of-and-leniency-from -administrative-fines-.
51. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING (U.K.), How YOUR BUSINESS CAN ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE:
1.6 (June
A GUIDE TO ACHIEVING COMPLIANCE WITH COMPETITION LAW: GUIDANCE 6,
2011), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/ca-and-cartels/competition-awareness
-compliance/oftl341.pdf.
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Singapore, 52 Australia,5 3 South Africa,54 France,5 5 Israel,56 India,5 7 and
by the FTC.58
COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAMS PROMOTE GLOBAL POLICY
OBJECTIVES
Compliance and ethics programs have been found to be key tools in
promoting important public policy objectives. There is no more effective
way to control the conduct of large organizations. They have been
promoted as instruments to achieve important policy objectives
regarding prevention of corruption, fraud, pollution, invasion of privacy,
healthcare fraud, and many other forms of organizational misconduct.
There is no valid policy reason why prevention of cartels should be
treated as a less important policy objective. If policy makers believe
that cartels are serious offenses against the public then they should be
using and recognizing this essential tool to prevent and control them.
Effective compliance and ethics programs historically have not
It has
simply emerged from industry unguided by government.
consistently been active government support and promotion that has
made the difference. But those in industry are astute on this point government actions and commitment matter and empty rhetoric is
routinely ignored by those in the private sector. If competition law
enforcers do nothing but give speeches and write articles, but offer no
value for such programs, then those in industry are smart enough to

52. COMPETITION COMM'N OF SINGAPORE, supra note 39, T 2.13.
53. AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMM'N, CORPORATE TRADE
PRACTICES COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS III (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.

acec.gov.aucontent/item.phtml?itemId=717078&nodeld=0de4caOa69fe9ddeO37bf8l391b2c
dab&fn=Corporate%20trade%20practices%20compliance%20programs.pdf.
33 (S.
54. See, e.g., Competition Comm'n v. Pioneer Foods Ltd. 2007 15/CR/FebO7,
Afr.), available at http://www.comptrib.co.zalassets/Uploads/Case-Documents/15CR
Feb07%20Pioneer.pdf.
55. COMPETITION AUTHORITY OF FRANCE, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 36, available at

http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/synthese2008-uk.pdf. "The Autorit6 already
encourages compliance programs thanks to commitments that can be made, in the course
of a settlement package. It wishes to speed up the process by taking a more proactive
approach, outside the litigation context. Beneficial to a competitive economy, this
preventive compliance may be an element structuring the company's strategy. The cost of
a program should be viewed against the investment in terms of legal security, image, and
ultimately, trust on the part of clients and consumers."
56. ISRAEL ANTITRUST AUTHORITY, MODEL INTERNAL COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 7 (Nov.
1998), availableat http://www.antitrust.gov.il/FilesHPLinks/Internal%/2OCompliance.pdf.
57. COMPETITION COMM'N OF INDIA, COMPETITION COMPLIANCE PROGRAMME FOR
ENTERPRISES 26 (June 2008), available at http://www.cci.gov.in/images/medial
Advocacy/compcompliance-pro.pdf'phpMyAdmin=NMPFRahGKYeum5F74Ppstn7Rfoo.
58. Joseph E. Murphy, An FTC View of Compliance Programs: Good Faith Efforts
Can Mean No Penalties,4 CORP. CONDUCT Q. 53 (1996).
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focus on actions, not mere words. Corporate resources will not be
directed to activities that bear no fruit.
Moreover, only the government can ensure that corporate programs
are themselves marked by actions and not mere rhetoric. Effective
programs call for tough levels of commitment within companies. When
government makes it clear that effective programs matter and will
result in favorable treatment, then and only then does the government
have the leverage necessary to get industry's attention and cause
companies to upgrade their efforts to be truly effective. On the other
side of the antitrust division, however, both the EU and the DOJ
Antitrust Division have needlessly forfeited their leverage by only
paying lip service to programs.
What is it that makes a company's competition law compliance and
ethics program effective? What is it that governments need to promote
in companies? Full coverage of this topic is beyond the scope of this
article. In fact, both authors of this paper have written entire treatises
on this topic. But here in a nutshell are the types of steps needed to
make a program actually work, and also the types of steps that may be
missing in antitrust programs, at least in jurisdictions on the wrong
side of the antitrust division:
Audits and monitoring. Programs need to be more than talk.
There need to be efforts to actually find out what employees are doing,
and whether they are violating the rules.
An empowered, senior officer-level chief ethics and compliance
officer with sufficient autonomy, empowerment, and resources. If there
is not a strong compliance and ethics officer at the top, the program
may be nothing more than a corporate decoration.
Effective communications. All those acting for the company need to
know the antitrust laws and be convinced to follow them. Boring
lectures by lawyers do not work; effective adult learning techniques do.
Effective communications requires targeting a message to the right
employees, and putting it into a form that will be relevant to the
employees. The shotgun approach is usually not very effective.
Incentives and discipline. Those who break the rules and ignore
the compliance and ethics program need to be held accountable. Those
who manage and supervise them need to be held equally accountable.
The incentive system needs to promote ethical and compliance conduct.
Other management tools. There are many other management tools
needed in a program. The Sentencing Guidelines and the Canadian
Competition Bureau's Guidance bulletin5 9 show the way. Similarly, the
OECD Working Group on Bribery's twelve step Good Practice Guidance

59. COMPETITION BUREAU CANADA, supra note 49.
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provides effective guidance, allowing for only a few differences related
to corruption versus treatment of cartels.
BRIDGING THE "ANTITRUST DIVISION"
How can we move beyond the artificial and dysfunctional division
originated by this one enclave of enforcers in the Department of
Justice's Antitrust Division?
How can antitrust enforcement
authorities around the world harness the force of compliance and ethics
programs to more effectively prevent cartels? The change would not be
difficult, and there are more than enough good models around the
world.
Enforcement authorities that recognize the importance of
compliance and ethics programs do this through several vehicles. In
the U.S. Department of Justice, outside of the Antitrust Division,
prosecutors take programs into account in making decisions about how
to proceed against companies. Violations deemed less serious, or
mitigated by an existing compliance program, may be pursued with a
civil, rather than a criminal, remedy. In jurisdictions where enforcers
have discretion in how to proceed, they can readily take into account
the diligence of a company's compliance and ethics program.
Another useful tool is the consideration of programs in penalty
decisions. Here the Competition Commission of Singapore provides a
useful model. The Commission spells out key factors it considers in
programs:
2.13 In considering how much mitigating value to be
accorded to the existence of any compliance
programme, the
CCS will consider:
* whether there are appropriate compliance policies and
procedures in place;
* whether the programme has been actively implemented;
* whether it has the support of, and is observed by, senior
management;
* whether there is active and ongoing training for employees
at all levels who may be involved in activities that are
touched by competition law; and
* whether the programme is evaluated and reviewed at
regular intervals.6 0
While there is no specific number provided regarding the weight
given to programs, the important point is that this provision sends the
message that real programs count. In the UK, the OFT has said it will
give up to 10 percent reductions on penalties for effective programs. 6 1
60. COMPETITION COMM'N OF SINGAPORE, supra note 39.
61. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING (U.K.), supra note 51, at 32,
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This self-imposed, artificial limit, which only serves as a
counterproductive restraint on the government's own freedom, is
perhaps understandable given the existence of the environment set by
the EU and the U.S. Antitrust Division.
Enforcement authorities can also require that those who admit
misconduct and enter into agreed-upon arrangements with authorities
must institute effective programs. Unfortunately, in those cases where
the Antitrust Division does this - never for leniency applicants - the
programs have been formalistic measures readily dismissed by
corporate employees as legalistic exercises. None of the experience
developed in the past 20 years appears to have seeped into the
Division's decrees. Most remarkable is that those offenders admitted
into the leniency programs need do nothing at all.
The more justifiable approach, from a policy perspective, is to
require all those entering into consent decrees and especially those
coming into the leniency program, to adopt high-potency programs.
Governments should recognize that the mere act of being first to
disclose a violation does not merit praise and a complete pass from any
responsible action.
Companies that commit violations should be
expected to take serious steps to prevent recurrence. In this respect,
someone must be right and someone must be wrong in their approach.
Either the Criminal Division or the Antitrust Division is using an
effective approach. The policy factors behind effective compliance and
ethics programs strongly support the Criminal Division's perspective,
and raise unanswerable questions about the Antitrust Division's
unlimited rewarding of those in the leniency program.
Finally, it is time to end the dysfunctional antitrust division and
bring cartel prevention efforts into line with enforcement of other
important policy objectives. The hostile tone of the Antitrust Division
and the EU, which likely has served to sharply undercut preventive
corporate efforts in competition law compliance, needs to be
reconsidered. Government needs to speak with one voice to promote
effective corporate compliance and ethics efforts. Government, industry,
and the public can only benefit from enhanced corporate efforts to
prevent and detect misconduct, including the scourge of cartels. If the
governments of the world expect to treat competition law as a basic
tenet of international law, governing, as it does, the conduct of local and
multinational corporations, then they must also recognize the need to
accord competition law compliance programs their proper role in
determining enforcement priorities and penalties.

